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Abstract—Society is challenging systems engineers by demanding 
ever more complex and integrated systems. With the rise of cloud 
computing and systems-of-systems (including cyber-physical 
systems) we are entering an era where mission critical services 
and applications will be dependent upon ‘coalitions-of-systems’.  
Coalitions-of-systems (CoS) are a class of system similar to 
systems-of-systems but they differ in that they interact to further 
overlapping self-interests rather than an overarching mission. 
Assessing the sociotechnical risks associated with CoS is an open 
research question of societal importance as existing risk analysis 
techniques typically focus on the technical aspects of systems and 
ignore risks associated with coalition partners reneging on 
responsibilities or leaving the coalition. 
We demonstrate that a responsibility modeling based risk 
analysis approach enables the identification of sociotechnical 
risks associated with CoS. The approach identifies hazards and 
associated risks that may arise when relying upon a coalition of 
human/organizational/technical agents to provision a service or 
application. Through a case study of a proposed cloud IT 
infrastructure migration we show how the technique identifies 
vulnerabilities that may arise because of human, organizational 
or technical agents failing to discharge responsibilities. 
Keywords: Risk identification, systems of systems, sociotechnical 
systems, systems engineering and management.  
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Society is challenging systems engineers by demanding 
ever more complex and integrated systems. With the rise of 
cloud computing and systems-of-systems (including cyber-
physical systems) we are entering an era where mission critical 
services and applications will be dependent upon ‘coalitions-
of-systems’ [1, 2].  Coalitions-of-systems (CoS) are a class of 
system, similar to systems-of-systems, that comprise a set of 
systems that interact to further overlapping self-interests rather 
than an overarching mission [3, 4]. A distinctive trait of CoS is 
that their continuing operation is dependent upon the 
potentially fragile overlap of the coalition’s self-interests and 
therefore proactive risk management is essential [5]. 
If future mission critical services or applications are to be 
deployed as CoS then techniques are required to identify and 
analyze the risks of making coalition members responsible for 
provisioning parts of services or applications and the liabilities 
that may be incurred. This challenge is of academic importance 
as it raises many questions with respect to the development of 
abstractions that are practical and scalable enough to analyze 
large distributed sociotechnical systems [6-8]. 
In the near future a typical CoS scenario may comprise an 
enterprise using a commercial public cloud IT infrastructure to 
provision a service for customers. The parts of this CoS 
comprise the cloud provider’s infrastructure, the enterprise’s IT 
systems to monitor and manage virtual machines on the cloud 
infrastructure, the ISPs providing connectivity, and the 
customer’s IT systems consuming the service (perhaps to 
monitor and manipulate a physical process). This system meets 
the criteria of a CoS as it is held together by the following 
overlapping self-interests: to generate profit (cloud provider, 
enterprise, ISP); to obtain a desired service at a competitive 
price (customer). Like all CoS this system is fragile as the 
situation is dependent on the situation not changing in ways 
that a make the coalition’s self-interests non-overlapping e.g. 
significant changes in price or service quality. 
We propose that modeling the responsibilities of the agents 
in a system is a promising avenue for analyzing the risks 
associated with CoS. This is because entering into a coalition 
necessarily involves the reliance on other parties to discharge 
responsibilities appropriately such that services and 
applications meet service level agreements or safety standards. 
In this paper we demonstrate the use a responsibility 
modeling based risk identification approach to identify risks 
associated with the use of a commercial public cloud IT 
infrastructure by an enterprise to provision a service for 
customers in the Scottish North Sea oil & gas sector. 
II. COALITIONS OF SYSTEMS AND SOCIOTECHNICAL RISK 
Systems-of-systems are a class of system whose interacting 
parts comprise systems, that are owned and managed by 
independent parties, and whose parts evolve over time [9]. 
Typical examples are integrated supply chain management 
systems, integrated healthcare networks, and cyber-physical 
systems such as integrated embedded systems within ships, 
land vehicles, aircraft, or industrial plants. Coalitions-of-
systems (CoS) are a class of system similar to systems-of-
systems but they differ in that they interact to further 
overlapping self-interests rather than an overarching mission. 
Sociotechnical risks are an important factor when analyzing 
the risks associated with CoS as the self-interests that hold the 
system together may be fragile. For example, a CoS formed 
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around the use of a commercial public cloud infrastructure may 
be sensitive to changes in pricing or service offerings. 
Therefore in addition to understanding the technical risks it is 
important to understand the sociotechnical dependencies 
between parties, the kinds of changes that could disrupt the 
coalition and the liabilities that may be incurred. 
There are number of sociotechnical risk analysis 
approaches relevant to CoS. The most notable are Functional 
Resonance Analysis Method (FRAM) [10, 11], Systems-
Theoretic Accident Modeling and Processes (STAMP) [12, 13] 
and Responsibility Modeling for Risk Analysis [14, 15]. 
The FRAM approach is a process level accident analysis 
and risk analysis method. It uses the concept of interacting 
‘functions’ to represent a process and identify risks to the 
outcome of a process. FRAM is performed by divided up a 
process into a number of interacting functions comprising 
inputs, outputs, preconditions, control constraints, timing 
constraints and resources. The potential variability of functions 
is identified and the implication of this variability is determined 
by identifying its consequences on the outcome of the process. 
FRAM has been used to identify risks and analyze accidents 
involving sociotechnical systems including air accidents and 
medical accidents [16]. 
The STAMP approach is an institutional level accident 
analysis and risk analysis method. It uses the concept of 
interacting parts in dynamic equilibrium to represent 
institutional structures and identify risks in terms of ‘control 
problems’; the premise being that risks arise when a system’s 
behavior is not appropriately measured/detected and controlled. 
Identified risks are analyzed in terms of their interactions with 
the systems control structures and their resultant effect on 
institutional outcomes. STAMP has been used to analyze high 
profile sociotechnical accidents including the loss of Space 
Shuttle Columbia and the Walkerton water contamination 
tragedy [17]. 
The responsibility modeling approach is a tactical level risk 
analysis method. It uses the concept of responsible agents 
(human / organizational agents) and their interactions to 
represent a situation and identify risks in terms failures of 
agents to fulfill responsibilities. Risk identification is 
performed by: firstly modeling the responsibilities of the agents 
involved in a situation and the resources they require to 
discharge their responsibilities; secondly identifying the 
consequences/liabilities resulting from of an agent not having a 
resource or not discharging a responsibility. This is facilitated 
by the use of hazard keywords such as early, late, never, 
incapable, insufficient and impaired. Responsibility modeling 
has been used to analyze the failure of sociotechnical systems 
including E-counting systems in the Scottish elections and UK 
civil emergency planning [14, 15]. 
We believe that responsibility modeling is a technique that 
is complementary to both STAMP and FRAM. STAMP may 
be used to identify risks at an institutional governance level 
whilst FRAM may be used to identify risks at a process level. 
Responsibility modeling enables the analysis of situations at a 
‘tactical level’ by understanding the risks related to agents 
depending upon others to discharge their responsibilities. 
We believe that responsibility modeling offers a number of 
attractive characteristics that make it more suitable for 
sociotechnical risk analysis of CoS than either FRAM or 
STAMP. Firstly the responsibility abstraction provides a 
natural way of identifying the risks associated with CoS as 
entering into a coalition necessarily involves the reliance on 
other parties to discharge responsibilities. Secondly 
responsibilities are relatively unproblematic to elicit as people 
find them ‘natural’ to articulate in comparison to ‘technical’ 
constructs such as functions or goals. Thirdly responsibility 
modeling is relatively rapid to perform unlike FRAM. FRAM 
is concerned with process level risks and therefore elicits 
information such as functions, preconditions, control 
constraints and so on, which may be impractical for large-scale 
systems. Fourthly, STAMP is unsuitable as it focuses on 
institutional level control structures to identify ‘control 
problems’. This assumes that there already exist appropriate 
techniques to identify/detect risks with CoS therefore STAMP 
is not a candidate technique. 
Despite responsibility modeling having some similarities to 
goal-based risk analysis approaches, such as Astrolabe [18], it 
differs significantly. The concept of a responsibility embodies 
the notion that it is important how an agent acts. For example, a 
doctor that has performed procedures in accordance with legal 
and domain standards may have successfully discharged their 
responsibility for patient care even if their patient dies. 
Similarly if a patient lives but their treatment was unethical 
then the doctor will may be held liable. Unlike responsibility 
approaches, goal-based approaches principally focus on what 
has to be achieved, rather than foregrounding obligations, 
liabilities and conformance to norms or standards. 
III. RESPONSIBILITY MODELING FOR RISK IDENTIFICATION 
Responsibility modeling has been proposed by several 
researchers as a useful abstraction for analyzing the 
dependability of sociotechnical systems [19-21]. We use 
responsibilities as part of a graphical modeling notation that 
represents ‘responsibilities’ ‘agents’ and ‘resources’ 
interconnected by relationships. 
For the purposes of responsibility modeling a responsibility 
is defined as: 
“A duty, held by some agent, to achieve, maintain or avoid 
some given state, subject to conformance with organizational, 
social and cultural norms” [14] 
The term duty in this definition captures obligation and 
accountability aspects of responsibilities such that if an agent 
does not appropriately discharge their obligation they will be 
held liable. The phrase conformance with organizational, social 
and cultural norms captures the fact that responsibilities must 
be discharged in accordance with legal and domain standards. 
For the purposes of modeling the CoS analyzed in this 
paper we use the following entities and relationships: 
Responsibility: An entity representing a duty to achieve, 
maintain or avoid a specified activity or state. 
Information Resource: An entity representing a resource 
that provides information that contributes to meeting an 
obligation e.g. documents, databases. 
Physical Resource: An entity representing a physical 
resource that contributes to meeting an obligation e.g. a server, 
tape drive, machine. 
Human Agent: An entity representing a human being often 
referred to by their role e.g. Support Manager. 
Organizational Agent: An entity representing an 
organization e.g. an enterprise or government agency. 
Responsibility For: A relationship representing the 
allocation of a responsibility to an agent 
Has: A relationship representing the allocation of a 
resource to an agent or responsibility 
Association: A relationship representing that an entity is 
related to another. The association relationship may be 
annotated to clarify the relationship if necessary. 
Responsibility modeling may be combined with a HAZOPS 
style approach to identifying risks [14]. Risks are identified via 
the means of ‘risk clauses’ that are composed from a target, 
hazard, condition and consequences. 
Target: The entity or relationship to which the risk clause 
refers. E.g. An entity may be the responsibility to support and 
maintain a leased telecommunications line. A relationship may 
be the allocation of a responsibility or resource to an agent. 
Hazard: Using a restricted set of keywords we aim to 
provide a checklist of hazard source categories to consider. The 
hazard keywords we used are outlined below: 
• Early Occurrence of entity/relationship before 
required. 
• Late Occurrence of entity/relationship after required. 
• Never Non-occurrence of entity/relationship. 
• Incapable Occurrence did not take place although 
attempts were made to fulfill the obligation. 
• Insufficient Occurrence of the entity/relationship at an 
incorrect level. 
• Impaired Occurrence of the entity/relationship in an 
incorrect manner. 
• Changes: The entity/relationship changes on a 
permanent basis. 
Condition: A description of the potential conditions that 
could manifest as a result of the hazard category considered. 
Consequences/Liabilities: The potential effects or 
liabilities resulting from the hazard manifesting itself. 
An example ‘risk clause’ may be found in Table 1 at the 
rear of this paper. In the context of analyzing CoS the entities 
and relationships under analysis are those between agents or 
resources from different organizations. 
IV. CASE STUDY 
A. The Situation 
The case study organization is a UK based company 
(Company B) that provides bespoke IT solutions for the oil & 
gas industry. It comprises around 30 employees with offices in 
the UK and the Middle East. It has an organizational structure 
based on functional divisions (e.g. administration, engineering 
and support). We became involved with the organization as 
they were interested in exploring the cost saving opportunities 
that cloud computing could offer them. We therefore 
collaborated with the organization to assess the feasibility of 
the migration of one of the organization’s primary service 
offerings (a quality monitoring and data acquisition system) to 
Amazon EC2 – an infrastructure-as-a-service offering from 
Amazon Web Services. Naturally, we were aware that the 
introduction of a new technology could be disruptive so we 
analyzed the sociotechnical risks of the proposed migration. 
The situation was as follows: Company C is a small oil and 
gas company that owns some offshore assets in the North Sea 
oilfields. Company C needed a data acquisition system to allow 
them to manage their offshore operations by monitoring data 
from their assets on a minute-by-minute basis. Company C’s 
assets rely on the production facilities of Company A (a major 
oil company), therefore the data comes onshore via Company 
A’s communication links. Company C does not have the 
capabilities to develop their own IT systems; hence they 
outsourced the development and management of the system to 
Company B, which is an IT solutions company with a small 
data centre. Fig. 1 provides an overview of the system, which 
consists of two servers: 
 
Figure 1.  Logical structure of the ‘as-is’ system 
1. A database server that logs and archives the data 
coming in from offshore into a database. A tape drive is used to 
take daily backups of the database, the tapes are stored off-site. 
2. An application server that hosts a number of data 
reporting and monitoring applications. The end users at 
Company C access these applications using a remote desktop 
client over the Internet. 
The system infrastructure was deployed in Company B’s 
data centre and went live in 2005. Since then, Company B’s 
support department have been maintaining the system and 
solving any problems that have risen. This case study 
investigated the risks of deploying the same system using the 
cloud offerings of Amazon Web Services. Fig. 2 provides an 
overview of this scenario, where Company B deploys and 
maintains the same system in the cloud. 
 
Figure 2.  Logical structure of the ‘to-be’ system 
B. Fieldwork and Results 
We performed a series of interviews to identify key 
stakeholders and their responsibilities vis-à-vis the current ‘as-
is’ situation and the proposed ‘to-be’ situation after migration 
to cloud. Our investigative remit was to consider the effect it 
would have on Company B. However, we did not have 
permission to speak to suppliers or customers thus limiting our 
interviewees to: a project manager; a technical manager; a 
support manager; two members of support staff; and a business 
development manager. The interviewees were encouraged to 
discuss their concerns regarding the proposed project and also 
the opportunities that it could afford. In order to organize and 
integrate the available information we created ‘as-is’ (Fig. 3) 
and ‘to-be’ (Fig. 4) responsibility models of the situation. 
The purpose of these models is to provide a visual 
representation of the changes in stakeholder interdependencies 
and use this to structure the risk analysis. Agents are 
represented as triangular brackets. Responsibilities are 
represented as round edged rectangles. Resources in square 
brackets. The ‘responsible for’ relationship is represented by a 
line with a square end point. The ‘has’ relationship is 
represented by a line with a circular end point. As a form of 
shorthand entities (agents, responsibilities and resources) may 
be placed within a dashed container box and all those entities 
within the box share the relationship attached to the box. For 
example, in Fig. 3, the organizational agent ‘Telco’ is 
responsible for supporting the leased line and 
providing/maintaining their lease line pricing model. 
Upon contrasting the ‘as-is’ (Fig. 3) situation with the ‘to-
be’ (Fig. 4) situation we made a number of immediate 
observations. 
• The introduction of EC2-style services would not only 
affect stakeholders involved in the provisioning of 
technical services but would have a direct effect on 
Finance/Business development, Sales/Marketing, and 
Customer relations staff. 
• The support manager’s responsibility of timely 
resolution of support calls would be ultimately 
dependent upon agents and resources no longer within 
his control (e.g. Amazon EC2 support services). 
• In the ‘as-is’ situation, Company B has direct control 
of the in-house hardware on which the service executes 
and contractual relationship with the supplier of the 
leased line. 
• In the ‘to-be’ situation, Company B is losing control 
over service quality, as it no longer has end-to-end 
control over the resources required for a customer to 
consume their service. The service would execute on 
Amazon hardware and customers (Company C) would 
connect to the hardware via an ISP that customers 
would be responsible for. The introduction of multiple 
external parties (Amazon EC2 & Company C’s ISP) 
would result in additional complexity whilst 
troubleshooting as multiple external parties would be 
involved. 
• In the ‘as-is’ situation, the customer is dependent upon 
Company B as it has exclusive control of the hardware 
on which the IT solution runs. 
• In the ‘to-be’ situation, Company B loses an element of 
customer lock-in as does not have direct control over 
the hardware that runs customers’ IT solutions thereby 
opening the possibility of a competitor bidding for 
support work that Company B currently provides at a 
reasonable margin of profit. 
Following these observations we performed risk 
identification by using hazard keywords to identify and 
understand the risks posed by each inter-organizational 
dependency. We identified 14 specific risks associated with 
relying on a commercial cloud infrastructure service provider. 
These included some perhaps unexpected risks including: 
• Insufficient or inaccurate cloud infrastructure 
documentation leading to an inability to respond to 
support calls in a timely manner rendering the service 
unmanageable on cloud infrastructure. Company B 
may be liable for breaches of SLA. 
• The delayed creation, or inability to create, a virtual 
machine instance resulting in an inability to provide 
services to customers. Company B may be liable for 
breaches of contract for not delivering the solution 
according to agreed schedule. 
• Changes to cloud pricing models (or being told of 
changes after the event) resulting in billing models that 
no longer corresponding to the actual charges resulting 
in potential financial loss. 
• Changes in cloud service offerings resulting in service 
disruption, degradation of service, or increases in cost. 
Changes in cloud service offerings resulting in 
products having been sold that are no longer 
deliverable. Company B may be liable for breach of 
contract with customers. 
• Competitors offering rival support services due to the 
openness of the cloud infrastructure. 
• The customer’s ISP becoming impaired resulting in 
Company B’s engineers having to troubleshoot the 
problem with multiple external parties despite no 
wrong doing on their part. 
 
 
Figure 3.  Responsibility model of the “as-is” system 
 
Figure 4.  Responsibility Model of the “to-be” situation 
TABLE 1 EXAMPLE ‘RISK CLAUSE’ FROM COS RISK ANALYSIS 
Target Hazard Keyword Condition Consequences / Liabilities 
Risk 
(Li/Sev) Recommended Action 
Documentation for 
Managing and 
Maintaining EC2 
Insufficient Documentation does 
not provide sufficient 
or adequate 
knowledge of EC2 
infrastructure to 
maintain a 
commercial data 
acquisition systems 
Data acquisition system is not 
maintainable on EC2. 
Timely resolution of support 
calls is not manageable on EC2. 
 
Liable for breach of SLA with 
customer. 
Low/High Assess adequacy of 
documentation prior to migration 
and perform pilots to minimize 
risk. 
 
Renegotiate customer support 
SLAs with customer 
EC2 Service Offering Changes EC2 services being 
used to support 
customers are 
withdrawn 
Customer may have service 
disrupted or service degradation 
resulting in SLA liabilities. 
 
Increase in support calls. 
 
Liable to breach of contract for 
services sold that are 
undeliverable. 
Low/ 
High 
Find alternative way of 
provisioning service to 
customers. 
 
Consider implementing back-out 
plans to a different infrastructure. 
 
V. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
This case study demonstrates that responsibility modeling 
when coupled with hazard/risk-based keywords provides a 
means of identifying sociotechnical risks associated with 
coalitions-of-systems. It exposes the risks and liabilities an 
organization could face if coalition partners renege on their 
responsibilities to provision parts of a service or application.  
We are currently extending the approach to expand the 
scope of analysis to include the viewpoints and values of the 
stakeholders that will be impacted by migrating to a 
coalition-of-systems. This will add an additional dimension 
to the risk analysis, as it will go beyond looking at risks from 
a mechanistic means-end perspective where human agents 
are assumed to be passive & compliant. Instead it will also 
take into account factors that make stakeholders resist and 
conflict with change, which we believe represents an 
important class of risk that is missing from this analysis. 
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